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Position of Ethics in Islamic 
Science 
As explained in Chapter Four, 
according to Ibn Sina, science is 
divided into a theoretical 
sciences (al-‘ulum al-nadhary) 
and practical sciences (al-‘ulum 
al-‘amal).1 The former seeks 
knowledge of the truth; the latter 
of the good. The purpose of 
theoretical sciences is to perfect 
the soul through knowledge 
alone. The purpose of practical 
sciences is to perfect the soul 
through knowledge of must be 
done, so the soul acts in 
accordance with this knowledge. 
One of the practical sciences is 
ethics2 (akhlaq).  
                                               
1 Ibn Sina, Kitab al-Shifa, the Chapter 
of Division of the Rational Sciences (Fi 
Aqsam al-‘Ulum al-‘Aqliyah), translated 
by Michael E. Marmura, in Lerner and 
Mahdi, Medieval Political Philosophy: A 
Sourcebook, (Ithaca, New York: Cornel 
University Press, 1991), p. 2.   
2 Definition of Ethics. Ethics (via 
Latin ethica from the Ancient Greek  
"moral philosophy", from the adjective of 
According to Mutahhari, 
morals (akhlaq): these consist of 
the commands and teaching 
relating to the spiritual and 
moral characteristics of human 
beings, such as justice, fear of 
God (taqwa), courage, chastity, 
wisdom, endurance, loyalty, 
truthfulness, truth worthiness, 
etc., and prescribe ‘how’ human 
being should be.3  Things that 
                                                   
ēthos "custom, habit"), a major branch of 
philosophy, is the study of values and 
customs of a person or group. It covers the 
analysis and employment of concepts such 
as right and wrong, good and evil, and 
responsibility. It is divided into three 
primary areas: meta-ethics (the study of 
the concept of ethics), normative ethics 
(the study of how to determine ethical 
values), and applied ethics (the study of 
the use of ethical values). 
 
3 According to Murtada Mutahhari, 
Islamic teaching is divided into three parts: 
(1) Doctrines (‘aqa’id): These constitute 
the issues that must be understood and 
believed in, such as the Unity of God, the 
Divine Attributes, universal and restricted 
prophethood, etc. however, there are 
certain differences between Muslim sects 
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relate to human qualities are 
called akhlaq.4   
Nasir al-Din al-Thusi was 
famous the Commentator of Ibn 
Sina, also agrees that ethics is 
the practical science. There are 
two main works in al-Tusi's 
ethical output, the Akhlaq-i 
Muhtashami (Muhtashamean 
Ethics) and the Akhlaq-i Nasiri 
(The Nasirean Ethics), both 
written in Persian. In  the 
Akhlaq-i Nasiri, the first 'edition' 
of which was dedicated to the 
same Nasir al-Din, is arranged as 
a work of philosophical ethics. 
Its divisions into three parts - 
ethics (akhlaq), domestic 
economics (tadbir-e manzil), 
politics (siyasat-e mudun) - set 
the pattern for subsequent 
works on practical philosophy in 
the Islamic tradition. 
 
 
                                                   
as to what constitutes the basic articles of 
faith (usul al-din) in which belief is 
necessary; (2) Morals (akhlaq): These 
consist of the commands and teaching 
relating to the spiritual and moral 
characteristics of human beings, such as 
justice, fear of God (taqwa), courage, 
chastity, wisdom, endurance, loyalty, 
truthfulness, truth worthiness, etc., and 
prescribe ‘how’ human being should be; 
(3) The law (ahkam): Under this heading 
are discussed the issues relating to practice 
and the correct manner of performing acts, 
such as, prayers (salat), fasting (sawm), 
hajj, jihad, al-amr bi al-ma’ruf wa al-nahy 
‘an al-munkar, buying, renting, marriage, 
divorce and division of inheritance. 
Murtada Mutahhari, Understanding 
Islamic Sciences (London: ICAS Press, 
2002), p. 49.  
4 Murtada Mutahhari, ibid, p. 49. 
 The Aim of Ethics 
According to Ibn Sina,through 
the ethical science someone 
knows how man ought to be in 
his moral habits and in his 
actions so as to lead a happy life 
here and in the hereafter.  
Like Ibn Sina’s predecessors, 
Plato5 and Aristotle6, Ibn Sina 
                                               
5 Plato (Greek:  Plátōn, "wide, broad-
shouldered") (428/427 BC – 348/347 BC), 
whose original name was Aristocles, was 
an ancient Greek philosopher, the second 
of the great trio of ancient Greeks –
succeeding Socrates and preceeding 
Aristotle– who between them laid the 
philosophical foundations of Western 
culture. Plato was also a mathematician, 
writer of philosophical dialogues, and 
founder of the Academy in Athens, the 
first institution of higher learning in the 
western world. Plato is widely believed to 
have been a student of Socrates and to 
have been deeply influenced by his 
teacher's unjust death. Plato's brilliance as 
a writer and thinker can be witnessed by 
reading his Socratic dialogues. Some of 
the dialogues, letters, and other works that 
are ascribed to him are considered 
spurious. Plato is thought to have lectured 
at the Academy, although the pedagogical 
function of his dialogues, if any, is not 
known with certainty. They have 
historically been used to teach philosophy, 
logic, rhetoric, mathematics, and other 
subjects about which he wrote. 
6 Aristotle, one of Plato's greatest 
students, was born in 384 BC. Aristotle's 
father was a physician to the king of 
Mecadonia, and when Aristotle was seven 
years old, his father sent him to study at 
the Academy. He was there at the 
beginning as a student, then became a 
researcher and finally a teacher. He 
seemed to adopted and developed Platonic 
ideas while there and to have expressed 
them in dialogue form. When Plato died, 
Plato willed the Academy not to Aristotle, 
but to his nephew Speusippus. Aristotle 
then left Athens with Xenocrates to go to 
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says that the main of ethics is 
happiness.7 Ibn Sina says in the 
                                                   
Assos, in Asia Minor, where he opened a 
branch of the Academy. This Academy 
focused more on biology than its 
predecessor that relied on mathematics. 
There he met Hermias, another former 
student of Plato, who had become king of 
Assos. Aristotle married Hermias niece, 
Pythias, who died ten years later. During 
these years in Assos, Aristotle started to 
break away from Platonism and developed 
his own ideas. King Philip of Macedonia 
invited Aristotle to the capitol around 343 
BC to tutor his thirteen-ear-old don, 
Alexander. Tutoring Alexander in the 
Academy in Assos, Aristotle still remained 
the president of the Academy. In 359 BC, 
Alexander's father, King Philip decided to 
set off to subdue the Greek city-states, and 
left Alexander in charge, thus stopping 
Aristotle's tutoring of Alexander. King 
Philip was then murdered, in 336 BC, and 
Alexander then became king. He 
mobilized his father's great army and 
subdued some city-states, thus becoming 
"Alexander The Great". In 335 BC, 
Aristotle returned to Athens. Speusippus 
had died, but Aristotle was again not given 
the presidency of the Academy in Athens, 
instead, it was given to one of his 
colleagues Xenocrates. So, Aristotle 
founded his own school this time, it was 
named the Lyceum, named after Apollo 
Lyceus. In 323 BC, twelve years after 
founding the Lyceum, Alexander the Great 
died. In Greece resentment against the 
Macedonia hegemony seethed and riots 
broke out. Aristotle was accused of 
impiety, and his life become in serious 
jeopardy. So he left Athens, and went to 
his late mother's estate at Chalcis on the 
island of Euboea. He died there in the next 
year, 322 BC.  
 
7 In Greek philosophers, especially 
Socrates, Plato, and Aritotle, the good 
'happiness' called  eudaimonia, which 
might suggest that the goal is the state of 
mind which follows upon good action. But 
this is not what he means. Eudaimonia on 
his account is not a state of mind; it 
Book of al-Shifa: “Through this 
science one knows how man 
ought to be in his moral habits 
and in his actions so as to lead a 
happy life here and in the 
hereafter. This part is contained 
in Aristotle’s book on ethics 
(kitab Aristotle fi al-Akhlaq, that 
is the Nicomachean Ethics).”8 
For Plato, a 'happy' life is not 
one lived in a happy state of 
mind, but one which is 
objectively happy, one which an 
impartial judge would regard as 
fortunate ('a happy thought' -- 
not one which results from or 
produces a happy state of mind). 
'Fortunate', however, suggests 
something that depends on luck, 
whereas eudaimonia depends 
largely on good management. 
Perhaps 'eligible' (worthy of 
being chosen) is the best word; a 
good life is one which an 
impartial judge would regard as 
worth choosing if there were a 
choice. Imagine that we are 
invited to choose our lot, to 
choose among an array of 
possible life-histories; a 'happy' 
life is one which a sensible 
person making a careful choice 
might select. Happiness as a 
state of mind (pleasure) is a 
consequence of such a life, but 
not one of its constituent 
elements. To live a good life, to 
                                                   
consists in action, not in something else 
resulting from action. The good is 'an 
active life of the element that has a rational 
principle... life in the sense of activity'. 
8 Ibn Sina, Kitab al-Shifa, Book One, 
Chapter One, p. 3. 
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live well, is to engage in certain 
activities; pleasure will result, 
but is not the goal.9  
According to Aristotle, 
genuine happiness lies in action 
that leads to virtue, since this 
alone provides true value and 
not just amusement. Thus, 
Aristotle held that contemplation 
is the highest form of moral 
activity because it is continuous, 
pleasant, self-sufficient, and 
complete. In intellectual activity, 
human beings most nearly 
approach divine blessedness, 
while realizing all of the genuine 
human virtues as well.10 
The Commentator of 
Aristotle, Ibn Rushd, does not 
identify happiness with the 
contemplative life, as had done, 
but rather with conjunction 
(ittisal) with the active intellect, 
which the Muslim Neoplatonists 
- with whom he was at 
loggerheads - had regarded as 
man's ultimate goal.11 
                                               
9 Plato, Republic, in Sake Commins 
& Robert N. Lisnot (Editors), The World’s 
Great Thinkers Man and Man: The Social 
Philosophers (New York: Random House, 
1947), pp. 115-120.  
 
10 Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, 
Book X, 8, in Sake Commins & Robert N. 
Lisnot (Editors), The World’s Great 
Thinkers Man and Man: The Social 
Philosophers, pp. 57-90. On Aristotle’s 
ethics see also Betrand Russel, History of 
Western Philosophy (London, Boston & 
Sidney: Unwin Paperbacks, 1984), p. 185. 
 
11 Majid Fakhry, “Ethics in Islamic 
Philosophy” in Edward Craig (General 
Editor), Routledge’s Encyclopedia of 
The Neoplatonic element in 
Ibn Miskawayh's12 ethics is 
nowhere more pronounced than 
in his analysis of happiness. Its 
two subdivisions, according to 
him, are practical and 
theoretical. The latter consists in 
'conjunction' with the active 
intellect, whereby man is able to 
join the 'higher intellectual' 
realm. However, Ibn Miskawayh 
recognizes beyond this 
intellectual perfection a 'divine' 
or supernatural condition 
whereby man partakes of divine 
perfection or achieves a 
condition of self-divinization 
which goes far beyond his 
                                                   
Islamic Philosophy, (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1998), p. 64. 
 
12 Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn 
Miskawayh was born in Rayy around 
320/932. His full name was Abu Ali 
Ahmad b. Muhammad b. Yaqub. His name 
was Miskawayh, and not Ibn Miskawayh, 
but the Orientalists followed an inaccurate 
tradition and he became famous as Ibn 
Miskawayh.  He was a secretary and a 
librarian for the viziers al-Muhallabi (340-
52/950-63), Abu’l Fadl (353-60/951-70) 
and Abu’l Fath (360-6/970-6) and finally 
for the Buyid Adud al-Dawla (d. 372/983). 
Ibn Miskawayh was part of the Arab-
Persian artistocracy of his times and 
frequented the circles of the most learned 
of representatives of Islamic intellectual 
tradition. This included al-Tawhidi, al-
`Amiri, Ibn Sa`daan, al-Sahib ibn `Abbad, 
Abu Sulayman al-Mantiki, Badi` al-
Zaman, Abu Bakr al-Khwarazmi and 
many others. He studied the works of Ibn 
Tabari with Ibn Kamil who was a student 
of the famous historian. According to 
Yakut, Ibn Miskawayh died on 9 Safar 
421/16 Febrary 1030, at the age of 100. 
The major work of Ibn myskawaih in 
ethics is Tahzib al-Akhlaq.  
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worldly conditions. This 'divine 
condition' is also alleged to 
derive from an Aristotelian 
fragment On the Virtues of the 
Soul, which Ibn Miskawayh 
quotes in Arabic translation, but 
which is clearly different from 
the apocryphal tract of the 
Aristotelian corpus known as De 
virtutibus et vitiis.13 
For Miskawayh, our 
happiness arises through 
upwards movement, our 
misfortunes through movement 
in the opposite direction. This 
concept argues that unity is 
equivalent to perfection, while 
multiplicity is equivalent to a 
meaningless plurality of physical 
objects. Expanding his concept, 
Ibn Miskawayh explores the 
notion of justice. He 
distinguishes between human 
and divine justice. Human justice 
is variable and depends upon the 
changing nature of particular 
states and communities. The law 
of the state is based upon the 
contingent features of the time, 
while the divine law specifies 
what is to be done everywhere 
and at every time.14 
According to al-Kindi, was 
strongly influenced by the Stoic 
tradition, particularly the 
thought of Epictetus, which was 
                                               
13 Majid Fakhry, “Ethics in Islamic 
Philosophy” in Edward Craig (General 
Editor), Routledge’s Encyclopedia of 
Islamic Philosophy, ibid, p. 64. 
14 Majid Fakhry, “Ethics in Islamic 
Philosophy” in Edward Craig (General 
Editor), Routledge’s Encyclopedia of 
Islamic Philosophy, ibid, p. 64 and 156. 
known throughout the Islamic 
world at the time through 
contact with Syriac Christian 
scholars, if not through specific 
texts. Epictetus emphasized the 
importance of freedom from the 
world and human beings’ status 
as agents, who through their 
ultimate independence were 
responsible for their own 
happiness and independent of 
others.15  
For al-Ghazali, happiness, as 
the chief good, admits of two 
subdivisions, the worldly and the 
otherworldly. Otherworldly 
happiness, which is our ultimate 
goal, cannot be achieved without 
certain worldly goods. These 
include the four cardinal virtues 
of wisdom, courage, temperance 
and justice, the bodily virtues of 
health, strength, good fortune 
and a long life, the external 
virtues of wealth, kin, social 
position and noble birth, and 
finally the 'divine virtues' of 
guidance, good counsel, 
direction and divine support. 
Those virtues are referred to in 
the Qur'an and the hadith, al-
Ghazali says, and the final virtue, 
'divine support', is identified 
with the Holy Spirit (Surah 2: 87, 
253).16 
 In mystical thought, the view 
of Good and evil have relation 
with the theory of love (‘isyq). 
Ibn Sina describes the doctrine 
                                               
15 Majid Fakhry, “Ethics in Islamic 
Philosophy”, ibid, p. 62. 
16 Majid Fakhry, “Ethics in Islamic 
Philosophy”, ibid, p. 65.  
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of love (isyq) in Risalah fi 
Mahiyah al-‘Isyq.17 Ibn Sina uses 
the word ‘isyq in discussing a 
human being’s love for God. This 
objection, however, is not fully 
justified, for as the emphasis of 
the discourse on love is to 
express man’s desire to unite 
with God, the term ‘isyq may 
have the same qualities as the 
word hubb (affection). In the 
words, both isyq and hubb are 
used interchangeably to indicate 
the attainment of spiritual and 
mystical oneness with God. Ibn 
Sina’s theory of love (‘isyq), as 
Massignon pointed out, refers to 
the very Essence of God, into a 
discourse relating to “Necessary 
Emanation of God”.18 The term 
‘isyq also has been used to 
describe God as Love,19 the 
Beloved (al-ma’shuq), as Ibn sina 
wished to describe him, is one of 
God’s attributes, in the same way 
that other attributes are the 
Truth (al-Haqq), Pure Good (al-
Khayr al-Ma’ad), Pure 
Intelligence (al-‘Aql al-Mahd), 
Absolute Wisdom (al-Hakim al-
Muthlaq) and Pure Generosity 
(al-Jud al-Mahd).20   
                                               
17 Ibn Sina, Risalah fi Mahiyah al-
‘Isyq, Ed. Ahmad ‘Attas (Istambul: 
Matba’at Ibrahim Jazu’i, 1953), p. 29.  
18 Louis Massignon, Theory of 
Profane Love among the Arabs: the 
Development of the Genre (New York: 
New York University Press, 1971), p. 146. 
19 Joseph Norman Bell, “Avicenna 
Treaties on Love and Nonphilosophical 
Muslim Tradition” (1986), pp. 73-86.  
20 Ian richer Netton, Allah 
Transcendent: Studies in the structure and 
Al-Ghazali also describes 
about love (isyq). According to 
al-Ghazali, the road to moral and 
spiritual perfection is described 
as the 'quest for God'. The 
seekers after God must satisfy 
two conditions: their actions 
must be governed by the 
prescriptions or ordinances of 
the 'divine law' (al-shar'), and 
they must ensure that God is 
constantly present in their 
hearts. By this presence al-
Ghazali means genuine 
contrition, adoration and 
submission, born of the seeker's 
awareness of the beauty and 
majesty of God which al-Ghazali, 
like other Muslim mystics or 
Sufis, regards as analogous to 
human passion or love ('isyq).21 
 
Morals and Custom in Social 
Life 
According to Ibn Sina, we 
should be prescribed laws 
regarding morals and custom. 
The main of moral and custom 
are for the soul’s purification and 
for worldly interests. The good 
character in social life is justice 
(‘adalah) and the bad character 
is excess and deficiency because 
to be avoided for the harm they 
inflict in human interests. Ibn 
Sina says:       
“It is necessary that the 
legislator should also 
                                                   
Semiotics of Islamic Philosophy, Theology 
and Cosmology (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1989), p.p. 155-157.  
21 Majid Fakhry, “Ethics in Islamic 
Philosophy”, ibid, p. 65 
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prescribe laws regarding 
morals and customs that 
advocate justice, which is the 
mean. The mean in morals 
and customs is sought for two 
things: The one, involving the 
breaking of the dominance of 
the passions, is for the soul’s 
purification and for enabling 
it to acquire the power of self 
mastery so that it can liberate 
itself from the body 
untarnished. The other, 
involving the use of these 
passions, is for worldly 
interests. As for the use of 
pleasures, these serve to 
conserve the body had 
procreation. As for courage, it 
is for the city’s survival. The 
vices of excess are to be 
avoided for the harm they 
inflict in human interests, 
while the vices of deficiency  
are be avoided for the harm 
they cause the city.22  
 
Ibn Sina’s also says that the 
practical wisdom pertaining to 
worldly actions and behavior are 
also a good character in human 
social life.  
“By the wisdom as a 
virtue, which is the third of 
a triad comprising in 
addition temperance  and 
courage, is not meant 
                                               
22 Ibn Sina, Kitab al-Shifa, Maqalah 
al-‘Asyriyah, Fashal Khamis (Book of 
Healing, Metaphysics X, Chapter 5, 
translated by Michael E. Marmura, in 
Lerner and Mahdi, Medieval Political 
Philosophy: A Sourcebook, (Ithaca, New 
York: Cornel University Press, 1991).   
theoretical wisdom—for 
the mean is not demanded 
in the latter at all—but, 
rather, practical wisdom 
pertaining to worldly 
actions and behavior. For it 
is deception to concentrate 
on the knowledge of this 
wisdom, carefully guarding 
the ingenious ways 
whereby one can attain 
through it every benefit 
and avoid every harm, to 
the extent that this would 
result in bringing upon 
one’s associates the 
opposite of what one seek 
for oneself and result in 
distracting oneself from 
the attainment of other 
virtues.” For example, to 
cause the hand to be thus 
fettered to the neck means 
the loss of a man’s soul, his 
whole life, the instrument 
of his wellbeing, and his 
survival to that moment at 
which he attains 
perfection.”23 
 
Before Ibn Sina, al-Farabi also 
describes the important of 
justice. In his discussion of 
justice, al-Farabi also follows 
Aristotle's lead, arguing that 
justice consists in the equitable 
distribution of 'common goods' 
in the city or the state. These 
goods include security, wealth, 
dignity and public office, of 
which every member of the city 
                                               
23 Ibn Sina, Kitab al-Shifa, ibid, 
Metaphysics X, Chapter 5. 
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or state is entitled to a share. 
Another more general meaning 
of justice is given as 'man's 
exercise of virtuous actions in 
himself and in relation to others, 
whatever such a virtue might 
be'.24 
For Ibn Rushd, justice is then 
described along Platonic lines as 
the 'harmony' of the three 
corresponding virtues of 
wisdom, courage and 
temperance; but it has, as 
Aristotle stated in the 
Nicomachean Ethics, two 
subdivisions which Ibn Rushd 
calls common or universal, 
corresponding to 'perfect virtue', 
and particular, whose further 
subdivisions are distributive and 
certificatory.25 
There is three human’s 
power: The appetitive, the 
irascible, and the practical as Ibn 
Sina says the following: 
The power of men: 
“Since the motivating 
powers are three—the 
appetitive, the irascible, 
and the practical—the 
virtues consist of three 
things: (1) moderation in 
such appetites as the 
pleasures of sex, food, 
clothing, comfort, and 
other pleasures of sense 
and imaginations; (2) 
Moderation in all the 
                                               
24 Majid Fakhry, “Ethics in Islamic 
Philosophy”, op. cit., p. 65. 
 
25 Majid Fakhry, “Ethics in Islamic 
Philosophy”, ibid, p. 63. 
irascible passions such as 
fear anger, depression, 
pride, hate, jealously, and 
the like; (3) Moderation in 
practical matters.”  “At 
head of these virtues stand 
temperance, practical 
wisdom, and courage; their 
sum is justice, which, 
however, is extraneous to 
theoretical virtue. But 
whoever combines 
theoretical wisdom with 
justice, is indeed the happy 
man. And whoever, in 
addition to this, wins the 
prophetic qualities 
becomes almost a human 
god. Worship of him, after 
the worship of God, 
becomes almost allowed. 
He is indeed the world’s 
earthly king and God’s 
deputy in it.”26  
 
Between Good and Evil 
In al-Shifa al-Ilahiyyat, we 
find Ibn Sina twice raising the 
objector’s point that “it was 
possible for the First Governor to 
bring into existence absolute 
good, free from evil” and “why is 
evilness primarily not prevented 
from (being present in the last 
type of things just mentioned), 
so that it would be all good? (the 
“last type of things” being the 
sublunary world, which for Ibn 
Sina is the only part of the world 
that contains evil). In these two 
                                               
26 Ibn Sina, Kitab al-Shifa, ibid, 
Metaphysics X, Chapter 5. 
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passages we do not find Ibn Sina 
asking why it is that “the First 
Governor,” who for him is pure 
good (khayr mahd) does not free 
this world from certain kinds or 
amount of evil. Rather, he asks 
why it is that such a God does 
not free this world from any evil 
by “bringing into existence 
absolute good, free from evil,” or 
a world that is “all good”. 27 
Shams Inati makes a good 
summary and conclusion on Ibn 
Sina’s problem good and evil.  
Inati’s explanation as the 
following: (1) God is good and 
providential, but, precisely 
because of His goodness, God 
cannot intend any good or evil in 
the world. This thesis an implicit 
denial of God’s absolute power. If 
it is solution, it is not because 
God is absolutely good, but 
because God’s goodness is a 
limitation.28 (2) There is more 
good than evil in the universe. 
Essential evil is rare; only non-
essential evil is predominant. 
According to Ibn Sina, there is no 
evil except in the sublunary 
sphere, and, even there, real or 
essential evil only affects 
minority individuals.29 (3)  Evil is 
a necessary consequences of the 
good, and to wish the removal of 
                                               
27 Shams C. Inati, The Problem of 
Evil: Ibn Sina’s Theodicy (New York: 
Global Publications Institute of Global 
Cultural Studies Binghamton University, 
2000), p. 4.   
28 Shams C. Inati, The Problem of 
Evil: Ibn Sina’s Theodicy, ibid, p. 169. 
29 Shams C. Inati, The Problem of 
Evil: Ibn Sina’s Theodicy, p. 170. 
evil is to the removal of the 
good.30 (4) Evil is a necessary 
means for the good.31 (5) God is 
omnipotent; that is, God cannot 
free the world from evil.32 (6) 
Essential evil is privation of 
being, and therefore cannot be 
caused by God, who is the cause 
of being only.33 (7) Human evil is 
due human free will, resulting 
from knowledge34.  
As for the problem of destiny, 
Ibn Sina attempts to solve it by 
assuring us that rewards and 
punishments are not inflicted on 
us by God in the second life. 
Rather they are result of our 
own conduct. To say, there fore, 
that “God is just” and “there are 
rewards and punishments” is not 
inconsistent. God’s justice 
encourages good action and 
discourages its contrary, and has 
nothing to do with rewards and 
punishments.35  
The need for punishment 
depends on the possibility of 
evil, and Ibn Sina’s examination 
maintains that moral and other 
evils afflict individuals rather 
than species. Evils are usually an 
                                               
30 Shams C. Inati, The Problem of 
Evil: Ibn Sina’s Theodicy, p. 170. 
 
31 Shams C. Inati, The Problem of 
Evil: Ibn Sina’s Theodicy, p. 171. 
 
32 Shams C. Inati, The Problem of 
Evil: Ibn Sina’s Theodicy, p. 172. 
 
33 Shams C. Inati, The Problem of 
Evil: Ibn Sina’s Theodicy, p. 172. 
 
34 Shams C. Inati, The Problem of 
Evil: Ibn Sina’s Theodicy, p. 172. 
 
35 Shams C. Inati, The Problem of 
Evil: Ibn Sina’s Theodicy, p. 173. 
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accidental result of things that 
otherwise produce good. God 
produces more good than evil 
when he produces this 
sublunary world, and 
abandoning an overwhelmingly 
good practice because of a ‘rare 
evil’ would be a privation of 
good. For example, fire is useful 
and therefore good, even if it 
harms people on occasion. God 
might have created a world in 
another existence that was 
entirely free of the evil present 
in this one, but that would 
preclude all the greater goods 
available in this world, despite 
the rare evil it also contains. 
Thus, God generates a world that 
contains good and evil and the 
agent, the soul. acts in this 
world; the rewards and 
punishments it gains in its 
existence beyond this world are 
the result of its choices in this 
world, and there can be both 
destiny and punishment because 
the world and its order are 
precisely what give souls a 
choice between good and evil.36 
In interesting feature of al-
Farabi's ethics which has no 
Aristotelian parallel is the 
discussion of evil. He starts in 
Neoplatonic fashion by asserting 
that 'evil has no existence as 
such in anything found in these 
worlds; that is generally in 
whatever does not exist through 
                                               
36 Majid Fakhry, “Ethics in Islamic 
Philosophy”, op cit., p. 64. 
 
human volition. Everything 
therein is good'. Evil, then, is a 
predicate of human action, not of 
physical occurrences. However, 
al-Farabi disagrees with 
traditional Neoplatonists who 
identified being with the good 
and not-being with evil pure and 
simple, on the ground that 'being 
is good only when it is in 
conformity with justice (or 
merit); not-being is evil when it 
is not in conformity with justice'. 
This appears to reflect 
Heraclitus' concept of dike as 
chaos. 
Al-Farabi's successor and 
spiritual disciple Ibn Sina  is the 
author of a very short tract on 
ethics which follows closely the 
Platonic model in psychology. 
Ibn Sina divides the soul into the 
rational, irascible and 
concupiscent, to which 
correspond the virtues of 
wisdom, courage and 
temperance respectively, and 
with justice being the 
'summation' of all three. To 
ensure the enforcement of 
justice within the state, argues 
Ibn Sina, the existence of the 
caliph, as conceived of by the 
Shi'ites, is necessary as the 
sovereign of the world and God's 
vicegerent on earth.37 
More explicitly than al-Farabi, 
Ibn Sina develops in his 
psychological writings a theory 
of conjunction (ittisal) of the soul 
                                               
37 Majid Fakhry, “Ethics in Islamic 
Philosophy”, ibid, p. 64. 
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with the active intellect, that 
supermundane agency which 
according to the Muslim 
Neoplatonists governs the 
sublunary world. With this 
conjunction, he argues, is bound 
up the ultimate perfection of the 
soul which has attained the 
highest degree of wisdom and 
virtue, becoming thereby a 
replica or a mirror of the higher 
intelligible world. Therein lays 
man's ultimate happiness while 
his soul is still in the body.38 
On good and evil,  Ibn Sina 
says in Danishnama’i ‘Ala’i: 
Good can be applied to two 
ideas (ma’na). (1) One of 
these is that intrinsic 
goodness (niki) which is in 
something due to itself and is 
good for itself. It is the 
perfection (virtue; kamal) of a 
thing, for when it is absent 
from a thing, that thing is said 
to be deficient (naqis). It 
suffers in itself if it perceives 
an imperfection (naqsi) and it 
perceives imperfection totally 
(tamam). (2) ‘Good’ in the 
other instrumental sense is 
that due to which something 
else becomes better (niki 
bishtar buwad). That for 
which is possible to exist 
must be one of the following 
three kinds. (1) It may be 
such a being which cannot 
exist without good (khair) 
coming from it. It exists in fact 
due to this poverty. (2) 
                                               
38 Majid Fakhry, “Ethics in Islamic 
Philosophy”, ibid, p. 64. 
Although it may be a being 
which is predominantly good 
(ghalaba), it may at the same 
time be e being whose effect 
cannot be bad (bad) and 
malefic (sharr). Therefore, it 
remains a being of the good 
order. Examples are fire, sun, 
and water. For instance, the 
sun cannot be the sun itself 
having the proper nature of 
the sun and yet be of no 
benefit (fa’ida) to the order of 
the world, even though it is 
natural (tab’) that someone 
who faces it, baring 
bareheaded, will have a 
headache. Although fire is 
beneficial as well as useful to 
the universal order, a pious or 
wise man who falls into it will 
burn himself, for fire cannot 
be other than it is. The power 
procreation (quwwat-i 
shahwaini) cannot be sexual 
power and fail to benefit the 
good universal order (nizam-i 
khair-i kulli), though it may be 
harmful to a group of 
intelligences (ahl-i ‘aql). For 
some stars (sitaragan) it is 
impossible not to exist. While 
the effect of their existence is 
not such that it may lead 
some people astray, they are 
nevertheless harmful in 
concept by allowing some 
persons to become actualized 
as persons. Among such 
persons are those who by not 
existing would be neither of 
harm nor of benefit to the 
good universal order. To 
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demand that from these stars 
nothing but good should 
come is to demand that they 
be something other then they 
are, namely, they be of the 
first kind. Furthermore, to 
make such a demand would 
be the same as to demand 
that fire is not fire, that 
Saturn be not Saturn, and that 
such kinds of entities do not 
exist. (3) Finally it may be of 
such a kind in which evil 
(badi) and malevolence 
(sharr) are dominant. We 
must now consider the 
conditions of these three 
kinds of beings. If they should 
necessarily be, from what 
cause should they be 
realized?.39     
 
According to Ibn Sina, the 
human being is born ‘upon the 
natural disposition’ and is 
neither good nor bad by nature, 
although tending more to good 
than to evil; and this human 
being changes and adapts 
according to the influences of the 
environment and its education 
systems. If he is accustomed to 
evil, he will become evil; if 
accustomed to good, he becomes 
                                               
39 Ibn Sina, Danish Nama’i, translated 
by Parviz Morewedge, The Metaphysics of 
Avicenna (Ibn Sina): A Critical 
Translation-Commentary and Analysis of 
the fundamental Argument in Avicenna’s 
Metaphysica in the Danish Nama-i ‘Ala’i 
(The Book of Scientific Knowledge) 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, p. 
1973), pp. 80-81. 
good.40 The ethical thought of 
Ibn Sina has similarity with the 
ethical thought of Ikhwan al-
Shafa. The Ihkwan al-Shafa 
interest in ethics was confined to 
its bearing on their doctrine: 
acquiring theoretical knowledge 
and doing good in this life so that 
their souls may enjoy eternity 
and happiness in the hereafter. 
They start from the ascertain 
that character are either in born 
or acquired. Inborn characters 
begin with the formation of the 
foetus in the womb, and they 
develop therein gradually under 
influence of the planet. Innate 
character, or virtues, is 
specialized aptitudes assigned to 
different organs. They enable the 
soul to act through every organ 
and produce the sensation, 
action, or craft particular to that 
organ without peed for 
deliberation or choice. At one 
place the Ikhwan al-Safa assume 
that inborn characters are 
uniformly good. At another, they 
maintain that they are bad, and 
consequently, all religious, were 
revealed to resist the innate 
characters of man and to reform 
them if possible. After birth man 
begins to acquire virtues. He 
continues to do so until his 
death. There is in man an 
aptitude to do good, and with the 
same aptitude he can do evil. 
                                               
40 Ibn Sina, Kitab al-Siyasa, ed. by 
Louis Maaluf, Majallat al-Sarq (Cairo), 
1906, p. 1074. 14 
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Character and behavior are 
teachable.41 
Anything which should be 
done, if done as it should, to the 
extent to which it should, in the 
place where it should, at the 
same time when it should, and in 
view of the end for which it 
should, is called good. And he 
who does that thing deliberately 
and with choice is called a wise 
man, a philosopher, and a perfect 
man. Good, for the masses, is 
that which religion has enjoined, 
and evil, that which religion has 
prohibited.42  
Like Ibn Sina, human is 
influenced by environment, 
Ikhwan also describes that the 
character of man are  
determinated and modified by 
the disposition of the body, 
climate of the land, and the 
contact of the children with their 
parents, tutors, comrades, and 
with the people in prominence. 
The different circumstances 
through which man usually 
passes are important factors in 
making people change from one 
character into another.43  
 
Relation to the Aspect of 
Education 
Ethics is one of the practical 
sciences. Through this science 
                                               
41 Umar A. Farrukh, “Ikhwan al-
Shafa”, in M.M. Sharif (Editor), A History 
of Muslim Philosophy (Weisbaden: Otto 
Harrassowitz, 1963), p. 305. 
42 Umar A. Farrukh, “Ikhwan al-
Shafa”, ibid, p. 305. 
43 Umar A. Farrukh, “Ikhwan al-
Shafa”, ibid, p. 306. 
someone knows how man ought 
to be in his moral habits and in 
his actions so as to lead a happy 
life here and in the hereafter. 
In our social life, it is 
necessary that the legislator 
should also prescribe laws 
regarding morals and customs 
that advocate justice, which is 
the mean. The mean in morals 
and customs is sought for two 
things: for the soul’s purification 
and for worldly interests. The 
good character in social life is 
justice (‘adalah) and the bad 
character is excess and 
deficiency because to be avoided 
for the harm they inflict in 
human interests. As Ibn Sina 
says, there is three human’s 
power: The appetitive, the 
irascible, and the practical. 
God generates a world that 
contains good and evil and the 
agent, the soul. acts in this 
world; the rewards and 
punishments it gains in its 
existence beyond this world are 
the result of its choices in this 
world, and there can be both 
destiny and punishment because 
the world and its order are 
precisely what give souls a 
choice between good and evil. 
Ibn Sina is of the opinion that 
the human being is born ‘upon 
the natural disposition’ and is 
neither good nor bad by nature, 
although tending more to good 
than to evil; and this human 
being changes and adapts 
according to the influences of the 
environment and its education 
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systems. If he is accustomed to 
evil, he will become evil; if 
accustomed to good, he becomes 
good. On this point, Avicenna 
says: ‘When the child is weaned, 
then his education and his moral 
training begin, before he is 
attacked or overcome by 
blameworthy morals or 
objectionable characteristics. For 
evil morals so quickly take over  
the young boy, and bad habits 
soon prevail; and if any of these 
gain influence over him they 
overcome him, and then he 




























Avicenna emphasizes this 
elsewhere by saying: ‘All moral 
characteristics, the good and the 
bad, are acquired; and it is 
possible for the human being, 
when he has as yet no specific 
moral character, to obtain them 
for himself; and when his soul 
also chances upon some specific 
characteristic, he may move, by 
his own volition, away from it 
towards its opposite’.45 
        
 
 
                                               
44 Ibn Sina, Kitab al-Siyasa, op. cit. p. 
1074.  
 
45 Ibn Sina, “‘Ilm al-Akhlaq”, in 
Majmu al-Rasa’il, Majmu’ al-Rasa’il 
(Cairo: Matba’at Kurdistan al-Ilmiyyah, 
1328 AH), p. 198. 
 
